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Nordic Metal Trade Unions on the
Move: Responses to Globalization
and Europeanization
ABSTRACT ■ Despite economic globalization, the liberalization of European
markets and rapid technological changes, membership density in the trade
unions in the metal sector in the Nordic countries remains exceptionally high
compared to any other European region. The coverage of collective
agreements has also remained intact, and unemployment is low by European
standards. Nevertheless, the Nordic metal unions face a number of dilemmas.
They all recognize a need to engage more actively in international, and
especially European-level, policy-making, including the coordination of
bargaining processes. Yet they fear that European regulation may undermine
their national bargaining autonomy. They also recognize the need for a
common Nordic position with regard to European policies; but differences in
industrial structures and traditions of labour market regulation, alongside
different national relationships to the European Union and Economic and
Monetary Union, represent obstacles to closer cooperation between the
Nordic metal federations. Moreover, a lasting problem is the winning of the
support of their members for European and global activities.
KEYWORDS: Nordic Metal Trade Unions ■ globalization and Europeanization ■
metal sector
Introduction
In some respects, globalization is not a new challenge for the Nordic
metal industry. Ever since the early days of industrialization, it has been
exposed to fierce international competition and cross-national mobility
of labour. However, radical changes in the ownership and organizational
structures of companies have had a new and significant impact over the
past few decades. Workers and their unions have been faced by increased
flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), company restructuring, the
outsourcing of peripheral activities and relocation of labour-intensive
production to low-cost countries.
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In studies of comparative industrial relations, it is widely assumed that
the breakdown of trade barriers and the free movement of capital, goods
and workers will lead to increasing regime competition. This would entail
the imposition of restrictive macro-economic policies, the transfer of
investment from countries with strict regulations, high taxes and high
labour costs, and thereby the loss of production and workplaces and
increased social inequality in the high-cost countries of northern Europe
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1992). Some expect such changes to cause a
convergence in labour market and welfare state regulation, notably in the
direction of a deregulated Anglo-American model (Reich, 1992). Accord-
ingly, in the Nordic countries a combination of economic crisis, the intro-
duction of the Single European Market (also affecting Norway and
Iceland, as they are part of the European Economic Area (EEA)), and the
globalization of the economy in general has raised doubts about the
future of the Nordic labour market and welfare state models (Vartiainen,
1997).
The metal industries of the Nordic countries can be seen as the key
bargaining sectors within the national collective bargaining systems.
Their pattern-setting status reflects their importance within their national
economies and their high exposure to international competition. In this
sense, the Nordic metal sectors can be viewed as test cases for the adapt-
ability of bargaining systems to the external pressures of Europeaniza-
tion and globalization.
In this article, I discuss how the Nordic metalworkers’ federations have
responded to these challenges. First, I examine the consequences of
economic globalization and political change for these unions, their
organizational structures, and the collective bargaining systems in which
they participate. Second, I consider how these changes have affected
patterns of cooperation among these Nordic federations and, further,
how they cooperate with regard to European regulation and the cross-
national coordination of collective bargaining processes.
The article presents key findings from a cross-national Nordic research
project carried out primarily in 2002/03, but with additional information
gathered both in 2004 and 2005. The research was based on interviews
with representatives of the dominant trade unions in the metal sector in
the Nordic countries, and was carried out in cooperation with four
research centres: Fafo (Fagbevegelsens senter for forskning or Institute
for Labour and Social Research, Norway), FAOS (Forskningscenter for
Arbejdsmarkeds- og Organisationsstudier or Employment Relations
Research Centre, Denmark), Arbetslivsinstitutet (National Institute for
Working Life, Sweden), and Palkansaajien tutkimuslaitos (Labour Insti-
tute for Economic Research, Finland). Unfortunately, it was not possible
to include the fifth Nordic country, Iceland.
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National Consequences of Globalization and
Europeanization
The Nordic metal industries have changed fundamentally over the past
two decades. Although exports and investments in South-East Asia have
increased, the major part of both metal-related trade and investments go
to Europe; in effect, the EU/EEA has become the expanded home market
of these industries. In all the Nordic countries, the internationalization
of ownership structures as well as of production chains has been accom-
panied by large-scale processes of restructuring: a narrower focus on
‘core business’, the introduction of new technology, the outsourcing of
support functions, and the relocation of labour-intensive production.
Against this background, trade union representatives from the metal
sectors point to a number of effects of globalization and Europeaniza-
tion. First, fierce international competition and, thereby, a strict focus on
costs penetrate all aspects of employment relations at enterprise level.
Accordingly, the question of outsourcing or relocation of production is
always present. Second, demands related to the qualifications and flexi-
bility of employees have increased. This has enhanced the need for
further training and education. At the same time, there is a risk that some
groups of metalworkers will become marginalized, as they will not be
able to meet these demands. Third, as a consequence of mergers and
acquisitions, increasingly across borders, decisions seem to be taken
‘somewhere else’. Such changes in ownership structures have made it
more difficult for trade union representatives to establish a dialogue with
the owners. Fourth, many smaller companies in the Nordic metal indus-
tries are subcontractors for larger, often multinational enterprises and are
consequently part of cross-national production chains. This means that
strikes affect not only the individual company, but all links in the produc-
tion chain, and thus that the pressure on the strike-bound enterprise is
intensified. From the trade union point of view, it becomes important to
have well-developed, cross-national contacts. Fifth, the introduction of
new technology and restructuring have led to a change in the proportions
of blue- and white-collar workers in the metal industries. Because in most
Nordic countries these categories are members of separate unions, this
changes the relative size and weight of the different unions. Demands for
flexible (for example, just-in-time) production have led to the introduc-
tion of more flexible working-time schedules, a growth in the number of
small subcontractors and, in Finland and Sweden, an increased number
of employees on fixed-term contracts. Consequently, job security has
been weakened for many metalworkers.
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Stability and Change in Collective Bargaining
In spite of the profound changes in the Nordic metal industries, and in
contrast to most EU countries, the level of employment remained by and
large stable during the 1990s. However, traditional areas of engineering
have been substantially restructured or replaced by new types of produc-
tion, for example, those based on information technology (IT). After the
crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of employees in the
metal industries in all four Nordic countries studied increased between
1993 and 2000, although somewhat more in Sweden and Finland than in
Denmark and Norway (OECD, 2002). Moreover, in the past two decades
union membership rates have remained, by European standards, excep-
tionally high. In Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, 85–90 percent of metal-
workers are unionized. The figure is somewhat lower in Norway (around
60 percent) and showing signs of decline (Bråten and Dølvik, 2003).
Developments in collective bargaining systems in the metal sector have
not been uniform in the Nordic countries, and there have been elements
of both divergence and convergence. In all cases, the coverage of agree-
ments remains high despite the restructuring of bargaining systems,
especially in Sweden and Denmark. In Denmark, the main industrial
affiliates of the central confederation, LO-Danmark, formed a broad
bargaining ‘cartel’, CO-industri, in 1992. This was an enlargement of the
sector-specific cartel, CO-Metal, and represented a response to the
merger in the previous year between the employers’ associations in engi-
neering and in general manufacturing. While the interests of the bargain-
ing parties were centralized within the manufacturing sector at national
level, a decentralization of bargaining over primarily pay and working
time gained pace throughout the 1990s. Consequently, today around
two-thirds of the total of collectively bargained increases in costs (i.e. pay
and improved conditions) are negotiated at local level.
A similar development took place in Sweden. Peak-level bargaining
was eroded in the 1980s and formally abandoned by the employers in
1990, in favour of sectoral negotiation, while company bargaining grew
in importance. Trade unions in manufacturing then began to cooperate
increasingly closely, and in 1996 seven of the major federations created a
new umbrella organization, Facken inom industrin (unions in industry),
encompassing unions from all the Swedish confederations: Landsorgan-
isationene i Sverige (LO Sweden), Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation
(TCO or Confederation of Professional Employees), and Sveriges
Akademikers Centralorganisation (SACO or Swedish Confederation of
Professional Associations). In 1997, they were able to conclude a basic
agreement with the employers, which since then has set the framework
for decentralized wage negotiations and a procedure for conflict resolu-
tion (Elvander, 2002).
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Trade unions in the metal industries are more fragmented in Norway.
The largest private-sector union, Fellesforbundet (United Federation of
Trade Unions), was created in 1988 in a merger of five unions represent-
ing metalworkers as well as workers in other industries; but there are
several other unions in the metal sector. However, in the past decade the
collective bargaining system in the metal sector has shown stability,
despite a major strike in 1996 and rapid wage increases in the late 1990s.
In Finland, there has been little change to the rather fragmented struc-
ture of trade unions. However, in the context of renewed peak-level
incomes policies, cooperation between both individual unions and
confederations has improved in recent years.
There have thus been trends towards decentralization in the metal
sectors of all Nordic countries, but in general, company negotiations have
developed further in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway and Finland.
In the latter countries, the centralized character of their overall bargain-
ing systems was reinforced during the 1990s, although company repre-
sentatives are mandated to negotiate certain issues (in Norway, including
pay) within the nationally agreed framework. Despite contrasts between
countries, all these systems are examples of ‘centralized decentralization’
(Due et al., 1994) or ‘organized decentralization’ (Traxler, 1995). Central-
ized control of the bargaining process persists, despite significant national
variations with respect to the levels and modes of coordination.
The Nordic economies have followed the general euro-zone pattern,
with low inflation and independent central banks. Consequently, trends
in wages and costs have become much more important for macro-
economic adaptability. As the pattern-setting first-mover in national
bargaining, the metal sector plays a significant role in macro-economic
concertation (Dølvik and Vartiainen, 2002). Finland is part of the euro-
zone and its metal trade unions have accepted the establishment of a new
wage norm, underpinned by buffer funds designed to prevent nominal
wage cuts during economic shocks. High nominal wage increases have
given way to broad incomes policy solutions. The value of the Danish
krone is locked to the euro (making Denmark a shadow member of the
euro-zone), but this is not true of the Swedish krona. But in both
countries, external pressures and internal reforms have led to moderate
wage demands adapted to cost movements in the most important trading
partners (first and foremost Germany). In Denmark, a national tripartite
agreement in 1987 restricted increases in labour costs to the level in
competitor countries. In the Swedish industry sector, a bipartite agree-
ment in 1997 specified that wages should not rise faster than the EU
average (Elvander, 2002; Schulten, 2001). Norway (a member of the EEA
and thus of the single market) also had moderate wage increases between
1988 and 1996, but inflationary pressure in the oil economy and lack of
coordination in bargaining rounds led to much higher wage increases in
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the late 1990s. This, together with a rise in the value of the Norwegian
krone, threatened capital flight and significant job losses, leading to
tripartite incomes policy agreements from 1999.
Thus despite widespread expectations of collapse in the early 1990s, the
industrial relations systems in the Nordic metal sectors proved robust
and adaptable. They have adopted the hallmark of the traditional German
model: an interaction between wage bargaining and the low inflation
targets of independent central banks. In general, these systems have
displayed the paradigmatic shift seen elsewhere in Europe, from a
productivity-oriented collective bargaining policy towards a competi-
tion-oriented one (Dølvik and Vartiainen, 2002; Schulten, 2001).
Europeanization and Nordic Scepticism
Virtually all our interviewees emphasized that the dividing lines between
national, Nordic and European trade union policies are becoming
increasingly blurred. So many aspects of national trade union work are
influenced by European economic integration and European policy-
making that European issues have become ever more interwoven with
national policy-making. Consequently, union representatives in the metal
industries have also recognized a growing need for their organizations to
have a strong voice at European level. This they seek through a number
of different channels (Rasmussen, 2004): national authorities; national
political parties; the European Parliament; the European Commission;
their national confederations; their European sectoral organization, the
European Metalworkers Federation (EMF); and the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC). It should be added that although global
issues are moving up the agenda, European influence and coordination
are seen as much more specific, goal oriented, and useful than global
cooperation.
Priority is given to the EMF, the function of which has changed from
exchanging information on national collective bargaining rounds to more
concrete and binding policy-making. It facilitates not only the exchange
of information and experience, but also policy learning with regard to
European trends and the formulation of mutually binding policies.
Benchmarking and peer pressure form an important part of such
dynamics. All the Nordic trade unions in the sector share this under-
standing of the EMF (Andersen et al., 2003: 66; Blomqvist and Murhem,
2003: 170; Bråten and Dølvik, 2003: 117; Sund, 2003: 207).
This consensus on the need to engage in European policies contrasts
with the otherwise sceptical attitude towards European integration
traditionally found among trade unions in Norway, Denmark and
Sweden. However, the unions in the metal sector have had, and still have,
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a more positive approach towards the EU than the majority of unions in
the three countries. In the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU member-
ship, both Fellesforbundet and NITO (the union of engineers and tech-
nologists) recommended a yes vote, while LO i Norge (narrowly)
recommended a no vote. In Sweden and Denmark, respectively, Svenska
Metall and CO-industri campaigned actively for Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) membership, which was, however, rejected in
the referendums in both countries. In contrast, the Finnish labour
movement has a far more positive approach. The collapse of the Soviet
Union forced Finland to look westward for new markets and political
stability, and the economic crisis of the early 1990s was so deep that the
unions were prepared to move in new directions. Consequently, the trade
unions were anxious to inform themselves and their members about the
EU, and the metalworkers’ unions took the lead in this process (Sund,
2003: 206).
Among metal trade unionists in the three Scandinavian countries there
is scepticism towards EU directives on labour issues. Although it is
acknowledged that EU regulations have in several respects improved
workers’ rights, there is a fear that the spread of individual legal rights
may eventually undermine the systems of national collective agreements,
threaten the existing autonomy of the trade unions (and their counter-
parts, the employers’ associations), and consequently weaken the power
base of both parties. Especially in Denmark, there have been strong
attempts to implement EU directives via national collective agreements.
This has only been partly successful, as the Commission has pointed out
that collective agreements do not cover all employees in the Danish
labour market; consequently, it has been necessary to supplement the
collective agreements with complementary legislation (Andersen, 2003;
Falkner and Leiber, 2004). An additional dilemma, especially for the
Danish and Swedish metal federations, is the fact that agreements
reached in peak-level social dialogue tend to strengthen the position of
the national confederation at their expense. It is with some ambivalence
that the metalworkers’ unions see the central confederations play a key
role in not only the European inter-sectoral bargaining process, but also
in the national processes of implementing European agreements and
directives.
There is similar scepticism towards the European Works Councils
(EWCs). When the EWC directive was implemented, the Nordic metal
trade unions by and large saw them as bodies without substantial compe-
tences or potential. Furthermore, the possibility of having non-unionized
employee representatives was, and still is, perceived as problematic, since
works councils in the Nordic countries are ‘exclusively union mechan-
isms’ (Kjellberg, 1998: 76). At least in the early years of the EWCs,
Danish representatives seem to have functioned more or less in isolation
Andersen: Nordic Metal Trade Unions on the Move
35
from the trade unions, even though the vast majority of the representa-
tives were union members (Knudsen and Sørensen, 2000). However,
scepticism is slowly giving way to the view that the EWCs might become
useful bodies if closely linked to the national systems of joint influence
and codetermination. The metal unions today recognize that at least some
EWCs function relatively well and are discussing issues that are close to
the core collective bargaining agenda. At the same time, this provokes
concern that cross-national, enterprise-based agreements might conflict
with the national collective bargaining system.
It emerges as at least partly paradoxical that the Nordic metal unions
are, on the one hand, convinced that they need to engage more strongly
in European policy-making, above all via the EMF, while on the other
hand (with the exception of the Finnish unions), they remain sceptical
about important aspects of European labour policies. At the heart of this
ambiguity is the fear that the national collective bargaining systems can
be threatened. Coming from strong positions based on the high rate of
unionization and encompassing coverage of collective agreements, the
Nordic metal trade unions (especially in Sweden and Denmark) are key
players in the political and economic arena. Any interference that might
diminish the importance of collective agreements is a potential threat to
their position.
There is also a fairly strong belief within the metal-sector organiz-
ations, unions as well as employers’ associations, that Nordic labour
market regulation is well functioning – a view which is confirmed by key
indicators such as unemployment and competitiveness. In other words,
there is a fear that European regulation might disrupt existing national
bargaining systems or restrict the scope for nationally agreed changes –
though so far there is little evidence that European directives have had
such an effect.
The Nordic unions are also sceptical that EMF policy-making seems
to assume that it is ‘possible to pursue a common policy at sectoral level
in every European country’ (Nilsson, 2001: 278), whereas in several
European countries there is no effective sector-level bargaining system.
Thus they have tended to adopt a defensive approach to the work of the
EMF, giving priority to safeguarding the future existence of the Nordic
bargaining systems. Thus the Nordic organizations (which together
comprise around a fifth of EMF membership) are often viewed as a brake
on the enlargement of the authority of the EMF. Nordic representatives
are aware of this and have started discussions about how to develop more
proactive European approaches, but they also believe that their unions
are respected by the other EMF members because of their strong posi-
tions in their home countries, and feel that they do contribute construc-
tively to EMF activities (Bråten and Dølvik, 2003: 116).
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The EU and the Revitalization of Nordiska Metall
Nordiska Metall, established in 1970 by the metalworkers’ unions in
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, is the longest-estab-
lished federation for regional cross-border cooperation in the metal
sector in Europe (Löhman, 2002). Its activities gained new impetus in the
1990s, especially after Sweden and Finland joined the EU in 1995. From
then on its main focus has been on broader European developments, and
in particular on activities within the EMF. In this sense, Nordiska Metall
has become a regional body for the coordination of European policies,
or more specifically, for consolidating influence at EU level (especially
within the EMF) of the Nordic metal unions. However, it does not
formally represent the Nordic metal unions, merely coordinating the
positions and viewpoints of the different unions.
Today, Nordiska Metall consists of 14 unions (including white-collar
staff, engineers, and other professionals) from the five countries, repre-
senting almost one million employees. It has a secretariat of three full-
time employees in Stockholm. One of its key activities is to coordinate
information among the Nordic unions on their collective bargaining
demands, strategies, and outcomes. These activities are closely linked to
the 1999 EMF ‘coordination rule’ governing collective bargaining by its
affiliates (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000). Nordiska Metall formulates
annual action programmes for collective bargaining, and has established
a select working party on collective bargaining which meets approxi-
mately four times a year. There are also frequent informal contacts
between the Nordic representatives.
So far there has been only limited experience of the operation of the
coordination rule, as collective agreements in the Nordic countries are in
some cases renewed only every third or fourth year. However, over the
winter of 2003/04 there were more or less parallel sequences of bargain-
ing in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Germany. This triggered a
number of meetings. The defeat suffered by IG Metall in 2003 over its
demand for a 35-hour week in eastern Germany caused anxieties among
the Nordic unions as a bad omen for the German wage negotiations
scheduled for early 2004. The Danish CO-industri and Swedish Metall
have for a number of years held regular meetings with officials from the
adjacent region of IG Metall (Bezirk Küste) to exchange information and
discuss strategies. In advance of the 2004 pay negotiations in Germany
and Denmark, IG Metall Vice-President Bertold Huber together with
EMF Deputy General Secretary Bart Samyn met in Copenhagen for
discussions. Later, the collective bargaining group of Nordiska Metall,
with representatives from all four countries, met Huber at the IG Metall
headquarters in Frankfurt to discuss progress. According to CO-industri
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representatives, these meetings demonstrated that cross-border infor-
mation and coordination had been taken to ‘a new level’.
Over the same period, meetings of Nordic representatives were
convened in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway to discuss national priori-
ties in the forthcoming negotiations. Occupational pensions were high on
the bargaining agenda in Norway; in Sweden, the key issue was working
time; while in Denmark the main focus was on ‘softer’ issues such as
parental leave. Even though it is difficult to evaluate the impact of such
cross-national meetings and informal contacts, it should at least be
emphasized that these have today become more than the traditional exer-
cises of merely exchanging information on bargaining outcomes; these
sequences of contacts take place before and during the negotiation
process in each country.
The much-debated, cost-cutting deals concluded over the summer and
throughout the second half of 2004 in Germany constituted an unpleas-
ant challenge for the Nordic metal trade unions. The size of the German
economy means that the Nordic countries are directly affected by
developmental trends in Germany. Accordingly, German concession
bargaining may well shape the outcome of agreements to be concluded
in the Nordic countries. Developments in Germany also demonstrated
the need for steady flows of information concerning not only sectoral
multi-employer bargaining, but also company agreements, with deals on
cost cutting and job security at major firms such as Siemens, Daimler-
Chrysler, and Volkswagen attracting considerable media attention.
Nordic union representatives complain that they were not informed
early enough about many of these agreements, for example, that at
Siemens in July 2004. However, there was a more effective exchange of
information, and eventually coordination of action, in the case of GM
Europe’s plan to dismiss some 12,000 workers, the majority of them in
Germany. The General Motors (GM) restructuring plan posed a particu-
lar problem for cross-national trade union cooperation, since the
company announced that only one plant would assemble the next gener-
ation of SAAB 9.3s and Opel Vectras. Management intended to negoti-
ate separately with union representatives at Opel Rüsselheim (Germany)
and SAAB Trollhättan (Sweden) before deciding where to assemble the
cars in the future. Leaders of the German and Swedish unions and the
EMF issued a joint declaration in October 2004, with demands includ-
ing the negotiation of a restructuring framework at European level, no
interference with collective bargaining arrangements, and no plant
closures (EMF, 2004). This was followed by a call from the GM EWC
and the EMF for a European day of action. According to trade union
sources, more than 50,000 employees at the 13 GM locations in Europe,
as well as employees at the three plants in Brazil, took part. Eventually,
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in December 2004 an agreement was signed whereby GM Europe would
negotiate the implementation of the restructuring plan (EIRO, 2004).
Consequently, GM’s decision on where to assemble the future models
would be based on bids from Rüsselheim and Trollhättan, a process in
which the German and Swedish metalworkers’ unions have been deeply
involved. This so-called ‘beauty contest’ illustrates the dilemma faced by
the Swedish and German trade unions: they are competing for jobs, yet
also claim that they are jointly fighting against any plant closures. Such
a ‘contest’ can easily degenerate into sheer regime competition. In March
2005, GM decided that both the Opel Vectra and the SAAB 9.3 would in
future be assembled in Rüsselheim, following an agreement approved by
the works council there. In order to safeguard production at the plant,
the works council made a number of concessions, among them that up
to 2010 the collectively agreed pay increases for the sector will be reduced
by 1 percent (EIRO, 2005). As noted above, the joint declaration issued
by the Swedish and German trade unions and the EMF had insisted that
the restructuring process should not lead to any violations of collective
agreements, and some Swedish trade unionists saw these concessions as
a breach of the declaration. However, official representatives of Metall in
Sweden maintain that overall the cross-border coordination in this case
has been satisfactory and that the EMF has succeeded in playing a
positive role in the process.
The Nordic unions perceive the EMF’s coordination of national
bargaining processes as increasingly binding in character, while the evalu-
ation of national outcomes undertaken by its collective bargaining
committee has a real impact. If a national union fails to meet the criteria
of the coordination rule, it is a rather unpleasant task to present the
results to the committee. Accordingly, the Nordic unions consider that
the wage coordination rule and peer pressure provide an important brake
on downward wage competition in Europe. Yet it seems clear that the
wage coordination rule is not directly present at the bargaining table,
rather, it is ‘somewhere in the background’. In other words, the ‘rule’ is
not explicitly mentioned in the bargaining process, but the unions seek
to conclude agreements broadly complying with it over the business
cycle as a whole (Löhman, 2002: 18).
Apart from pay bargaining, Nordiska Metall seeks to coordinate the
policies of its affiliates on a number of other issues, such as industrial
policy, health and safety, strengthened relations to trade unions in the
Baltic region, and at the global level initiatives to promote global frame-
work agreements. Hence European integration has intensified Nordic
cooperation within the metal sector, but there also seem to be limits to
how far the coordination and integration of policies can be taken.
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Natural Born Allies?
There have been several occasions in recent years when the Nordic metal-
workers’ unions have failed to reach common positions on questions
regarding European policy, including within the framework of the EMF.
Although broad similarities in the systems of labour market regulation
across the Nordic countries have often been analysed (Bruun et al., 1990;
Kjellberg, 1998), there are also important differences in the characteristics
of the national industrial relations systems, including those of the metal
industries, which can hinder closer cross-national cooperation between
the metal unions.
The metal industry itself displays significant differences between the
Nordic countries. The larger part of the Danish metal industry consists
of small and medium-sized companies that produce specialist machinery,
tools, and instruments. A large proportion of firms are engaged in
business-to-business production, with the supply chain often extending
beyond the national border (Andersen et al., 2003).
By contrast, the Swedish metal industry has traditionally been domi-
nated by large firms, in basic metals and the car industry, for example. Its
ownership structures are concentrated, with the major banks and the
famous ‘ten families’ controlling the most important companies
(Blomqvist and Murhem, 2003). Today, enterprises based on information
technology have also become prominent, with the mobile-phone
producer Ericsson being the major example.
The driving force in the metal industry in Norway, and in particular
the workshop-based firms where around two-thirds of metalworkers are
employed, is the oil industry that has grown rapidly since the 1970s. A
contentious issue among trade unionists in the metal sector is the impact
on investment and competitiveness of Norwegian non-membership of
the EU. This also means that most channels for political influence at the
EU level are blocked. Accordingly, coordination at the Nordic level
becomes all the more important for the Norwegian unions (Bråten and
Dølvik, 2003).
The Finnish metal industry provided metal products, machinery, and
ships as a contribution to war indemnities to the Soviet Union in the
aftermath of the Second World War. Later, this was transformed into a
trading relationship, with the larger part of Finnish metal production
being exported eastward. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a
subsequent economic recession in the early 1990s, but the Finnish
economy recovered, and growth in the IT sector in particular boosted
exports and jobs, with Nokia being the prime example. Nokia also illus-
trates the importance of state research and development policies and the
influence of foreign investment, with 90 percent of its shares owned by
foreign investors (Sund, 2003).
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Even though there is consensus among the Nordic metal unions on the
need to safeguard the autonomy of their collective bargaining systems,
significant cross-national differences in the balance between legislation
and collective agreements can be identified. The Danish industrial
relations system is strongly voluntaristic: only the laws concerning the
industrial court and the public conciliator constrain the bargaining parties
and the relations between them. A key element in understanding the
autonomy gained by trade unions and employers’ associations is the fact
that Denmark has been ruled by coalition governments for more than
half a century. For example, in recent times governments led by the social
democrats have usually included centrist parties. Consequently, there has
been little space for one-sided alliances between governments and either
employers or trade unions. On the contrary, the consensus on safeguard-
ing the autonomy of the social partners has been, and still is, shared by
virtually all political parties. The strength of self-regulation distinguishes
the Danish system from those of other Nordic countries (Due et al., 2000;
Scheuer, 1998; Skulason and Jääskelainen, 2000). However, it should be
added that the law on the public conciliator (somewhat paradoxically,
given the voluntary nature of the Danish industrial relations system)
enables state intervention in the process of collective bargaining if the
parties fail to reach agreement (Stokke, 2002: 681–2).
In Sweden, social-democratic governments were the precondition for
the erosion of the principle of self-regulation and the introduction of
extensive labour legislation, first and foremost in the 1970s. Prominent
examples were laws on job security, union workplace representatives, and
codetermination (Kjellberg, 1998: 82). When the social democrats lost
power in 1976, after 44 consecutive years in office, the employers aban-
doned peak-level collective bargaining and pursued a radical decentral-
ization of the bargaining system. One interpretation suggests that the
Swedish industrial relations system has become regime dependent,
whereas the Danish remains regime independent (Due and Madsen,
2000); but this has been disputed by Nycander (2002: 90), who argues
that the role of the public conciliator and experience of government inter-
vention in industrial disputes demonstrate that social partner autonomy
in the Danish system is limited. An alternative formulation might be that
in both countries the scope for self-regulation is high, but that in specific
areas, which differ between the two systems, state intervention does
occur. Within the metal sectors in particular, the similarities have been
enhanced over the past decade, following the conclusion of the basic
agreement in Swedish manufacturing (discussed above), which reaffirmed
and enhanced sectoral collective bargaining.
The political environment of Norwegian industrial relations has been
similar to that in Denmark, with the social democrats dominant for
more than half a century, but normally ruling at the head of coalition
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governments. However, the absence of a powerful capitalist class in the
early 20th century and economic dependence on natural resources and oil
revenues help explain why the Norwegian state has played a more active
role in industrial and employment policies than in Denmark and Sweden.
Consequently, even in more recent years Norwegian employers, in
contrast to Danish and Swedish employers, have seen advantages in state
intervention in order to maintain stable economic conditions. The experi-
ence of decentralized bargaining in the 1980s and again in the late 1990s,
leading to wage drift and economic instability, seems to have convinced
Norwegian employers that centralized bargaining within the framework
of state-initiated incomes policies is preferable (Bråten and Dølvik, 2003;
Dølvik and Stokke, 1998; Dølvik and Vartiainen, 2002: 69–94).
The most encompassing legislative regulation of the labour market is
found in Finland. This is illustrated by the presence of a legally based erga
omnes procedure that generalizes the coverage of collective agreements.
Strong tripartite relations have also formed the basis for a number of peak-
level agreements during the past three decades. Typically, the state has
paved the way for these agreements by linking tax reforms, increased social
security, and changes in labour laws to agreements reached by the bargain-
ing parties on wages and conditions. The political background in Finland
is also distinctive in that the Social Democratic Party has not had the
dominant role traditional in the other Nordic countries. In recent years,
Finnish governments have been coalitions consisting of both socialist and
non-socialist parties (Dølvik and Vartiainen, 2002: 59–64; Lilja, 1998).
In summary, there are important differences between the metal sectors
in the Nordic countries, reflecting distinctive historical processes of
industrialization, the contemporary structure of the industries, and the
typical size of enterprises and patterns of ownership, despite the impact
of economic globalization. The variations in the balance between legis-
lation and agreements help explain why the Nordic metalworkers’ unions
have failed at times to reach shared views on how, and to what extent,
European regulation might interfere with the Nordic collective bargain-
ing systems. This also explains differences in the preferred means of
implementing EU directives, as for instance with the application of those
on part-time and fixed-term work (Andersen, 2003).
Despite occasional disagreements, the Nordic metalworkers’ unions
are more than ever committed to extending and strengthening their
policy coordination and cooperation. These attempts are linked to a
strong Nordic tradition of intergovernmental information exchange and
cooperation in many policy fields, including labour market regulation.
Likewise, social partner contacts, formal as well as informal, are well
developed across Nordic borders. Consequently, the search for common
‘Nordic positions and opinions’ often appears to be the obvious strategy
when it comes to European, if not global, issues.
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Nevertheless, a narrow focus on Nordic cooperation might present an
obstacle to the development of new alliances and new solutions to the
challenges caused by Europeanization and globalization, and hence
impede their influence on European-level policy-making. The Nordic
countries, or the unions in the metal sector, might not be ‘natural born
allies’ after all. In view of EU enlargement, new challenges arise (for
example, with regard to relocation), and there is an obvious need for
deepened cooperation and alliance building with unions across the Baltic
Sea. Furthermore, over the years the Nordic metalworkers’ unions have
to varying degrees developed bilateral contacts with unions in other
European countries. Probably because Denmark joined the European
Community more than two decades earlier than Sweden and Finland, the
Danish unions seem to have the most developed formal and informal
contacts with unions in the ‘old’ member states.
Challenges for the Trade Unions in the Nordic Metal
Sector
It can be argued that European integration has brought the Nordic metal
unions to a crossroads: will they continue to meet in order to celebrate
Nordic brotherhood or will they be able to coordinate common
European policy initiatives? Will they continue acting as a ‘brake’ on
European regulation or develop new alliances in the European context
(for example, within the framework of the EMF), and will they thereby
be able to counterbalance the otherwise dominant influence of IG
Metall?
Europeanization and globalization present a number of challenges for
the Nordic trade unions, given their organizational structures and
membership base. Whereas these unions have traditionally had their
stronghold at national level, the European and workplace levels are
becoming increasingly important in policy terms. Moreover, various
expressions of discontent with the way international activities are organ-
ized can be identified in all the Nordic unions. This includes disagree-
ment between sectoral unions and confederations on who should have
the primary responsibility for EU-related issues, and between local
branches, national unions, and confederations on who should have the
primary responsibility for supporting EWCs (Blomqvist, 2003: 223).
Consequently, as international trade union work becomes ever more
complex, which in turn increases demand for new competences among
trade union representatives, there is also a growing need to prioritize and
pool scarce resources and to coordinate policies across traditional demar-
cation lines.
In spite of existing differences, a major concern of the Nordic
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metalworkers’ unions has been the fate of their national collective
bargaining systems in a more Europeanized and globalized economy.
This concern is linked to the deep-seated understanding that these
systems make up the power base of the Nordic unions. Nevertheless,
over the past decade the bargaining systems in the Nordic metal sectors
have shown a surprising resilience and capacity to adjust to significant
structural changes. These changes include deepened European integra-
tion, but also divergent trajectories in Nordic labour market regulation,
illustrated by striking variations in the scope and depth of processes of
decentralization of the bargaining systems and in the implementation of
EU directives. Yet in view of their fear of European interference, it could
be asked whether the Nordic metalworkers’ unions lack belief in the
adaptability and robustness of their national collective bargaining
systems in their encounter with European regulation.
Finally, the most fundamental challenge for the unions in the metal
sector is how to increase their knowledge of and the mobilization behind
international and especially European trade union activities. The vague
and hesitant support of metalworkers for European integration in
general, and an evolved European social dialogue in particular, is still
widespread in all Nordic countries except Finland. One illustration of
this is a survey carried out for the Swedish LO in 2002, in which union
members were asked to specify the most important issues for trade union
activities: European trade union cooperation came sixteenth among the
20 core issues listed (Blomqvist and Murhem, 2003: 171). Reflecting the
strength and legacy of national unionism in the Nordic countries,
securing membership support for European and eventually global trade
union work is probably the most tricky challenge facing unions in the
Nordic metal sector in the years to come.
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